

On-going risk assessments on African swine fever

Sixteen Meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on African swine fever in Europe under GF-TADs umbrella

Sofie Dhollander



Trusted science for safe food


EFSA's risk assessments on ASF



Special issue on ASF: more than 30 EFSA outputs online at:

https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/toc/1 0.2903/1831-4732.african-swine-fever

EFSA JOURNAL



On-going mandates on ASF





ASF working groups



ASF'SWG

Christian Gortázar, Spain (CHAIR)

EPI-5 subgroup

- Karl Stahl, Sweden (CHAIR)
- Christian Gortázar
- Hans-Hermann Thulke

Exit strategy subgroup

- Arvo Viltrop (CHAIR)
- Edvins Olsevskis
- Hans-Hermann Thulke
- Sandra Blome
- Simon More
- Vittorio Guberti
- Federica Loi

Gap Analysis subgroup

- Miguel Angel Miranda Chueca (CHAIR)
- Christian Gortázar
- Sandra Blome
- Anette Botner

Outdoor farming subgroup

- Christian Gortázar (CHAIR)
- Sandra Blome
- Simon More

Matrices subgroup

- Helen Roberts (CHAIR)
- Anette Boklund
- Anette Botner

EFSA-AHAW

- Sofie Dhollander
- Andrea Gervelmeyer
- Yves Van der Stede
- Corina Ivanciu
- Elisabeth Dorbek-Kolin
- Alessandro Broglia
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- Gabriele Zancanaro


EFSA-AMU

- José Cortinas Abrahantes
- Olaf MOSBACH-SCHULZ

EFSA-DATA

Alexandra PAPANIKOLAOU





Exit strategy: EFSA-Q-2020-0042

< January 2021




Terms of Reference

- 1. Specific to Estonia and Latvia, EFSA should clarify
 - (i) the risk factors possibly contributing to ASF persistence in affected areas over a number of years in wild boar populations. <April 2021
 - (ii) the **role of seropositive wild boar** in the context of ASF infection, and in particular in areas with no current evidence of virus circulation.

- 2. EFSA should define pathway(s) to ASF freedom in relevant areas in accordance with the Strategic approach to the management of African Swine Fever for the EU and recommend criteria for defining an area as free from ASF in wild boar.
 - In this task, EFSA should take into account the results of wild boar testing (in particular, antibody detection and virus identification) and the results in relation to the identification of wild boar carcasses (with differing time since death)




Methodology:



Strategy to Freedom of ASFV circulation



Exploration field data



E.g.: Exploration field data: ESTONIA

- Gradual decline of seroprevalence since the last PCR positive sample
- Significantly smaller seroprevalence in young animals
- Seroprevalence in young animals approaching zero
- No oscillating patterns in seroprevalence indicating undetected virus circulation



Fading out epidemic?

But: PCR positive sample in Sep

2020: new introduction?



Spatial explicit stochastic model


Objectives:

- 1) Identify different patterns of serological surveillance results given different scenarios associated with persistence of infection at low prevalence. These <u>scenarios</u> should consider the:
 - Spatial clustering of infection
 - Sampling procedures are not homogenous
 - Different drivers of persistence (based on literature review outcomes: e.g. the presence of 'carriers' animals, duration of immunity, reduced case-fatality rate)
 - On-going surveillance to detect ASFV circulation

2) To predict patterns of surveillance results (virological, serological, combined) that could occur at the tail of the given a range of different epidemiological scenarios



Spatial explicit stochastic model





Exit strategy

Outcome model:

Biological rationale for surveillance decisions




To propose overall decision criteria to underpin stages of an exit strategy taking into account:

- -Different assumptions regarding persistence mechanisms and observed epidemiological scenarios
- -Time component strategy
- -Practicality of surveillance strategy





< March 2021







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Name	Country
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SUPEANU Alexandru	Romania
Staubach Christoph	Germany
Komitas Georgios	Greece
WALLO Richard	Czechia
WOZNIAKOWSKI Grzegorz	Poland



Reporting period: 01 Sep. 2019 - 31 Aug 2020







Terms of Reference

- 1. Analyse the epidemiological data on ASF from MS and non-EU countries affected by ASFV Genotype II
 - Temporal and spatial patterns
 - Ranges and speed of transmission
 - Sources of introduction in pig holdings
- 2. Risk factors involved in the occurrence, spread and persistence of the ASFV. In particular, risk factors involved in the occurrence of ASF in domestic pig farms in Romania should be identified
 - wild boar population
 - domestic/wildlife interface
- 3. Analyse the data and information on the geographical areas called white zones applied by free Member States (in particular France and Luxembourg at the border with Belgium) for preventing the spread of the disease in wild boar.
 - Assess the effectiveness of the measures and review scientific literature addressing these measures.
 - Review and assess the robustness and effectiveness of the boundaries used for the determination/demarcation of these areas.


EPI 5 report




Descriptive epidemiology:

- Narrative sections from affected MS and maps of outbreaks
- Proportions of PCR/ELISA positive samples (Loess smoothing)
- Consolidation findings of network analysis with spatial explicit model to relate local speed of propagation to local population and habitat characteristics

- Annual herd incidence rate
- Evolution yearly wild boar density
- Proxy for 'secondary cases' based on potential infection network








Risk factor analysis

WILD BOAR:

 Generalised additive model to identify risk factors for ASF occurrence in wild boar in Estonia, Latvia and Romania.

DOMESTIC PIGS:

 Same model, considering some of the covariates used in the Estonian analysis (wild boar density, pig density, distance to nearest outbreak or case...)





White zones

- Proposed analysis
 - **Step 1**:Detailed data collection of information about measures in white zone:

Location white zone	Physical description barrier	Hunting measures	Carcass detection (data, modality, intensity)
Shape file	Date of construction and description of fence	Description of duration, intensity of hunting modality Results of testing	Description of duration and intensity, carcass detection modality Results of testing

• **Step 2**: evaluation specific measures with spatial explicit stochastic model to compliment model exercise carried out in EFSA 2015 and EFSA 2019





< June 2021



Follow up on European Commission Mar

- Request for scientific and technical assistance:
 - Identify the main research gaps to address the needs of risk managers involved in the prevention and control of ASF.
 - Research priorities that should be addressed in a short time frame (< 1 year).

https://efsa.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.2903/j.efsa.2019.5811



Access by EFSA Library





Terms of reference



- 1. Design studies needed to evaluate:
 - (i) the impact of reducing the wild boar population densities in relation to transmission of African swine fever virus (ASFV);
 - (ii) the natural behaviour of wild boar to improve wild boar population management.



Terms of reference







- 2. Studies needed to understand:
 - (i) the **role of arthropod vectors** in ASF transmission (biological and mechanical);


- (ii) ASF survival and transmission from contaminated environment and
- (iii) residual infectivity of **buried wild boar** carcases.



Terms of reference

3. The **patterns of seasonality** in wild boar and domestic pigs and identify main factors that determinate these patterns.

Provide recommendations in particular in relation to risk mitigation options to address these factors, where relevant.





- Step 1: Identification of research objectives by working group: example wild boar
- Step 2: Identification of research priorities by broader networks
- **Step 3**: Prioritization of research priorities
- Step 4: Development of calls for research proposals (short research protocols) for research priorities:

- Arthropods <u>EFSA-Q-2020-00431: 6</u> research proposals: <u>Vectornet</u>
- Wild boar <u>EFSA-Q-2020-00430: 14</u>
 research proposals: <u>Enetwild</u>
- ASFV survival in environment
 EFSA-Q-2020-00429: 1 research
 proposal: ASF Working group
- Seasonality: <u>EFSA-Q-2020-00428: 2</u> research proposals: <u>Copenhagen</u> <u>University</u>





MATRICES: EFSA-Q-2019-00618

Matrices



- assess and rank different matrices according to the risk they pose to transmit **ASFV**
- matrices or products that can be traded or moved across borders between ASFaffected and non-ASF-infected areas and can legally be exposed to pigs in non-ASFaffected areas
- 1. animal by-products for use in feed derived from pigs
- 2. non-pig-derived feed materials that could be contaminated with ASFV
- compound feed and feed additives
- bedding and enrichment material
- empty vehicles for live pig transport































Matrices



Review of peer-reviewed literature



Public consultation of identified evidence

Expert Knowledge Elicitation

Risk Assessment model







Probability of at least one infection of a pig in the overall non-affected area:

PAt least one infection event from area i by product j = 1
$$- [(1 - g_s)^{r(i,j)}^{m(i,j,s=small)} (1 - g_s)^{(1-r(i,j))}^{m(i,j,s=large)}]$$

where, $\underline{m}_{i,j,\text{large}}$ and $\underline{m}_{i,j,\text{large}}$ are the total number of units entering all small and large farms, while r is the proportion of consignments of a specific product, j, from a specific region, j, going to small scale farms, approximated as ratio of the number of pigs in small scale farms by the number of all pigs in the non-affected areas of EU.

Matrices



Experts involved in expert knowledge elicitation

Con	tamı	ınatı	On.	⊢K ⊢
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Dirk Pfeiffer

Daesung Yoo

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Pawel Fiedorow

Lisbeth Harm Nielsen

Carsten Pohl

Arno van Gorp

Farm Exposure EKE

David Goodier

Merel Postma

Christine Leeb

Rachel Cummins

Maria Gellermann

elix Ardelean





Outdoor farming: EFSA-Q-2020-00425

Outdoor farming



European Commission (EC) Strategic approach provides for a general recommendation for a prohibition of outdoor keeping of pigs at least in the areas covered by Decision 2014/709/EU (=affected by ASF)

Some EU Member States proposed to derogate from ban and to set biosecurity criteria to allow for derogations

Scientific Opinion on

- the infection risks associated with keeping of pigs outdoors in ASF-affected areas,
- the characterization and categorization of keeping of pigs outdoors in the Member States
- efficient biosecurity measures that might allow to minimize African swine fever virus (ASFV) introduction into and ASFV spread from pigs kept outdoors



Outdoor farming



- Animals are held in woodlands/forests without any fence
 Animals are held in fields or on pastures without any fence
- 5) Animals are held in open buildings which are fenced







- 2) Animals are held in woodlands/forests which are fenced
 4) Animals are held in fields or on pastures which are
- 6) Animals are held in closed buildings with access to a fenced concrete outside run/yard

fenced







Outdoor farming




- Questionnaire survey to competent authorities of MS and Farmers'
- Information from the EU Animal Disease Notification System (ADNS) and SCoPAFF presentations of affected MS
- Expert Knowledge Elicitation: categorization of outdoor pig farms in EU MS according to their risk of ASFV introduction and spread
- Expert Knowledge Elicitation: proposing control and biosecurity measures



STOP ASF CAMPAIGN





Objective: Increase awareness of ASF and the reporting procedures to follow.

Target countries: those at risk from the spread of ASF, as identified in EFSA's 2019 risk assessment.

Audiences and communication objectives



Audiences



Pig farmers and livestock operators: regular contact with pigs



Hunters: contact with wild boar



Checkpoint staff, border police, rangers: enforcement of the rules



Travellers: transport of pork products

Objectives

Prevent the spread


Detect the signs

Report suspicious cases

Prevent, detect and report











https://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/StopASF#/
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