
# African Swine Fever (ASF) confirmatory diagnosis and molecular characterization at the EU-Reference Laboratory for ASF

Subdirección General de Laboratorios de Sanidad Animal y Vegetal



- **1. First report** on 5 December 2025. A more extensive report is still pending. (confidential, virus sequence will be made available at due time ).
- 2. Main findings and conclusion:
- ✓ Confirmation of NRL results (real time PCR)
- ✓ Virus sequencing (Sanger & WGS):
  - Genotype II (= genotype currently circulating in EU Member States)
  - Genetic group 29 (similar to genetic group1: Georgia 2007), different from known genetic groups currently circulating in EU Member States



# Measures taken by the Ministry of Agriculture (Central Competent Authority) in response to EURL report`s findings.

- 1. Hyphotesis of **origin**:
  - Unknown virus strain currently circulating in EU or Europe and Asia third countries (fomites?)
  - Biological containment facility in Spain or abroad (laboratory leak?)
- 2. Fact: Proximity of a BSL 3 laboratory near the first two outbreaks of the disease
- 3. Response: opening of a complementary epidemiological investigation according to art. 57.2 del Reglamento (UE) 2016/429 (Animal Health Law).
  - Ask the European Commission for technical assistance: **EU vet team** of **laboratory experts**



## EUvet team -lab experts visit. 11-12 December 2025

1. Meeting venue: Animal Health Research Center of Catalunya (IRTA-CReSA)

### 2. Participants:

- EUvet team members
- Representatives of the EU Reference Laboratory (CISA-Valdeolmos, Spain)
- Representatives of the Central Competent Authority (MoA)
  - Representative of the National Reference Laboratory (LCV, Algete Madrid)
- Representatives of the Regional Competent Authority (Generalitat de Catalunya)
- Representatives of IRTA-CReSA
- Representatives of a private pharmaceutical company operating on CReSA's premises





## EUvet team lab expert visit. 11-12 December 2025

### Main topics:

- **Description of level 3 biological containment facilities.** Photo report and videos of the facilities (for safety and time reasons, the level 3 biological containment facilities was not visited).
- Biosafety management protocols.
- **System for authorizing personnel** working directly or indirectly with the ASF virus.
- **Inventory (list) of ASF** virus strains stored at CReSA.
- Records of virus strains entries and exits (origin/destination/volume/purpose).
- **List of in vivo trials** conducted in the facilities with the Georgia 2007 ASFv strain in the last two years.
- **Assessment of critical points in the facility or protocols** that could have led to a hypothetical virus leak.





## EUvet team lab expert visit. 11-12 December 2025

### 4. Main conclusions (I)

- > The analyses carried out by the reference laboratories (NRL, EURL) are of high-level and relevant.
- The EURL conducted sequence analysis, including the Whole Genome Sequencing (WGS), which led to a **detailed genetic characterization of the outbreak ASFv strain**.
- Comparison of these sequence to sequences publicly available was performed. These analyses do not allow identification of the origin of the virus due to lack of closely related strains in the databases.
- These analysis allowed **identification of genetic markers** in the viral genomes sequenced. These markers could **help to trace** the origin of the virus if other sequence data become available.



## EUvet team lab expert visit. 11-12 December 2025 (II)

- 4. Main conclusions (II)
- The **laboratory (CReSA) biosecurity measures** presented are **adequate** and well established.
- The laboratory is aware of the risks of virus escape from the facility and has established **assessment of critical points** in the facility or protocols.

Based on the data presented, the **EUVET team could not** identify any obvious route by which the virus could have been released from the IRTA-CReSA facilities.



## EUvet team lab expert visit. 11-12 December 2025 (II)

#### 5. Main Recommendations

- Continue sequencing viruses detected in disease outbreaks (ongoing by the NRL)
- Perform sequencing of relevant viruses available in IRTA-CReSA and in the private company operating in CReSA's premises (ongoing: NRL & EURL)



## 정말 감사합니다





