



1st GF-TADs Regional Conference in the European region

FMD Members experience - Slovakia







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FMD in Slovakia – time lapse


- Phone notification of FMD outbreak in Hungary to CVO SK on 6th March 2025
- Official notification by letter on 7th March 2025 (Ref.No.: ÉlfF/152/2025)
 - FMD primary outbreak Kisbajcs, Győr-Moson-Sopron County (47.745480N 17.694840E approx. 2km from Hungary-Slovak border)
- SVFA animal health alert launched on evening 6th March 2025
- Morning on-line emergency meeting with DVFA's on 7th March followed by:
 - Establishing restricted zones in line with CDR(EU)2020/687 parts of DVFA Dunajská Streda and DVFA Komárno
 - Issuing measures in line with CDR(EU)2020/687

Martin CHUDY, DVM. SK CVO










21th March Confirmation of FMD in SK


- SK NRL FMD confirmed FMDV serotype O in three holdings within DVFA Dunajská Streda
 - Medveďov SK-FMD-2025-00001 (705 bovine)
 - Nárad SK-FMD-2025-00002 (806 bovine)
 - Baka SK-FMD-2025-00003 (1313 bovine)





FMD Measures

- On local level
 - Established restriction zones 3km and 10km in line with CDR(EU)2020/687
 - Issuing measures in line with CDR(EU)2020/687
 - Epidemiological investigation
 - two contact holdings (Jurová and Dolný Štál)
 - animal movement
 - personell contacts
 - other economical activities
 - 12.3.2025 strong wind north-west direction reported




FMD Measures

- On central level
 - Extraordinary emergency measures of CVO
 - Activated NDCC
 - Notification to EC and MS
 - Adoption of National vaccination plan, request for EC and MS assistance with vaccine supply




Food and Agriculture
Organization of the
United Nations





Brief overview of the disease

- 6 confirmed outbreaks (2 primary, 4 secondary) in commercial cattle holdings.
- our first outbreak: 21/03/2025,
- our last outbreak: **04/04/2025**.







Brief overview of the event: depopulated COMMERCIAL farms


No.	Outbreak farm				
		Depop	ulation	Number of animals	Vaccinated
					\times
		Start	Finish		
SK 01	Medveďov	29.3.2025	30.3.2025	706	all
SK 02	Ňárad	30.3.2025	1.4.2025	806	all
SK 03	Baka	22.3.2025	26.3.2025	1 313	
SK 04	Malá Lúč	27.3.2025	28.3.2025	268	all
SK 05	Plavecký Štvrtok	2.4.2025	7.4.2025	3 521	all
SK 06	Jurová	9.4.2025	10.4.2025	876	all
					7
CONTACT FARM	Dolný Štál	11.4.2025	14.4.2025	851	all
			TOGETHER	8 341	

















Date from:	01.01.2025	to:	22.09.2025 06:00	Disease:	FMDV	
Number of farms ex	amined					1846
Number of infected	farms /date of last outbreak					6/11.04.2025
Number of livestock to	ested/Number of positive animal	S FMDV PCR				17595/205
Number of livestock tested/ Number of positive animals FMDV-NSP ELISA						47030/78
						\
Number of wild game	tested/ Number of positive anim	ials FMDV PCR				19/0
Number of wild game	tested/ Number of positive anim	als FMDV-NSP ELISA				15933/0

Geographical distribution of domestic animals samples submitted for FMDV serological investigation in Slovakia during 2025 (January - August)



Geographical distribution of domestic animals samples submitted for FMDV virological investigation in Slovakia during 2025 (January - August)







Official Vaccination Plan - SK

- Main intentions and objectives, as well as the chosen vaccination strategy and official vaccination plan:
- The chosen vaccination strategy in the Slovak Republic is:
 - > emergency suppressive vaccination
- (according to the definition in Article 2(1)(c) of Delegated Regulation (EU) 2023/361).

The main objective is to suppress or reduce the spread of the virus by kept animal species listed, located at the outbreak or in certain epidemiologically linked establishments to the lowest possible level until the animals concerned are slaughtered and safely disposed of.











- - 141 pigs
- - 52 sheep,
- - 35 goats,
- - 9 cattle
- BACKYARD FARMS 3 km from the first outbreak TOGETHER: 237 animals
- COMMERCIAL FARMS TOGETHER: 8 341 animals

• TOGETHER: 8 578 ANIMALS DEPOPULATED











Disposal of the carcasses

- > only 1 rendering plant in Slovakia
- right emergency measures ordered by CVO: disposal of the carcasses also via the **burial sites**
- cooperation on governmental level (ministers)
- ➤ 2 localities were choosed for the establishing of the burial sites (in military districts, the land belongs to the Army of SR) one of these sites was located only 35 km from SK 05 more than 3 000 animals from this farm were disposed via this burial site











Subject: sampling for foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) from susceptible wild game in the Slovak Republic - amendment to guideline 3.

The State Veterinary and Food Administration of the Slovak Republic ("SVFA SR"), in accordance with Section 6, paragraph 2, letter a) of Act No. 39/2007 Coll. on veterinary care, as amended, issues these guidelines on sampling for FMD from hunted and dead susceptible wild animals in the Slovak Republic, valid **from 01. 09. 2025.**


Samples are taken from susceptible wild game for FMD only from dead or hunted susceptible wild animals with symptoms of the disease indicative of FMD (ulcers on the lip, ulcers in the interphalangeal space, malaise, loss of timidity). After reporting such a finding to the DVFA, a sample for the virological examination is carried out by an official veterinarian. These samples are taken throughout the Slovak Republic.










Geographical distribution of wild animals samples submitted for FMDV serological investigation in Slovakia during 2025 (January - August)







Laboratory Investigations of FMDV in wild animals in Slovakia during 2025 (January - August) - district Dunajská Streda





Laboratory Investigations of FMDV in domestic animals in Slovakia during 2025 (January - August) - district Dunajská Streda









Conclusions – our experience

- 1. seems that most susceptible are highly productive dairy cows,
- 2. detection in fattening bulls slightly delayed,
- 3. before showing typical vesiculs (aphtae) cattle present unusual play with tongue with smacking,
- 4. later all typical signs were observed aphtae on gums, tongue, udder, interungulate space, hypersalivation, apathy, feed intake decrease
- 5. emergency suppressive vaccination minimise clinical signs in animals (3-4 days after application), decrease virus spreading which provide to us sufficient time for safe depopulation,
- 6. cleaning and disinfection of premises and materials is the most important action following depopulation.











Lessons learned

- The spread of the virus is very simple and fast. The spread of FMD can only be controlled and stopped by immediate reactions and strict, correctly set measures and vigorous enforcement of their implementation. The measures are extremely resource-intensive: human, financial, technical, laboratory.
- By the time an outbreak is detected on a large farm, the virus has often already spread to other farms, so it is
 necessary to monitor all possible movements and other contacts and determine the level of risk for additional
 contact farms. Measures in case of suspicion of FMD need to be ordered for all identified contact farms or for
 an appropriate area considering the extent of contacts.
- The FMD incubation period is 2-14 days, and from the perspective of epi-investigation, it is of course necessary to take into account the maximum extent of this period. However, it is extremely important to take into account that in the case of indirect transmission of the virus by fomites (objects, vehicles, tools, feed, people with shoes/clothing/hands, etc.), the date of contact (e.g. vehicle entry to the farm) may not mean (and usually does not mean) the date of infection of animals on the farm. The FMD virus can survive in the environment/material under suitable conditions (depending on pH, temperature, humidity) for up to several weeks or months. Therefore, it is advisable not to stick exclusively to the interval of 14 days (WOAH) or 21 days (i.e. the monitoring period according to EU legislation) from the first symptoms but it should also be borne in mind that the introduction to the farm could have occurred several days or weeks earlier.









- Regular and frequent evaluation of the situation in order to assess the effectiveness of the measures is crucial for the success of ordering the following measures. Communication of measures and coordination of all components is essential.
- Biosecurity on many cattle farms was very weak, farms did not have disinfection facilities, farms did not provide comprehensive records of the movement of people and vehicles on the farm, effective hygiene loops and separation of black and white zones were missing. A number of farms in technologically used areas that cannot be secured, operate and disinfect operate. It is necessary to establish minimum requirements for biosecurity and provided the provided that the provided the provided that the provided that









• Ways of communication:

Crisis Management Board – daily meetings of CMB members (veterinary administration, police, customs, rescue system, army, anticonflict teams (psychologists), local government representatives...) analysis of previous day development and planning activities for next 3-5 days













• Ways of communication:

 Webinars with different stakeholders – veterinary administrations official veterinarians, veterinary practitionairs, farmers and food producers associations (actual situation, updated measures, planned activities,...)














- ➤ Depopulation of outbreaks
- ➤ Kiling of animals description of methods
- > safe disposal of carcasess- rendering plant + burial
- ➤ Restrictions on movement through the municipalities where the infection occurred + the surrounding area
- ➤ Contact farms within a radius of 3 km preventive killing vis a vis citizens sufficient human resources
- ➤ Financing
- Legislative power emergency situation authorizations/empowerments of the CVO














TCS tree (statistical parsimony analysis)

Presence of a single putative common ancestor for all the sequences recovered from infected animals provides evidence for a





Food and Agriculture Organization of the







Thank you for your attention

